Newly Declassified DOJ Watchdog Report Shows FBI Cut Corners in Clinton Email Investigation
I'm archiving "Clinton annex" here to make its text searchable. You can download the annex in PDF format via the link below:
Check my other posts for the previous parts. This is part 14, the last part.
V. (U) ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION
A. (redacted) Impact of Concerns about Potential Leaks of Information Related to the (redacted) Reports on Comey's Decision Not to Inform Department Leadership of His Plans to Make a Public Statement
(U) As we describe in Chapter Six of our unclassified report and above, Comey told the OIG that he became concerned in mid-June 2016 that classified information suggesting that Lynch was exerting influence on the Midyear investigation would be publicly released, and that this would impact her ability to credibly announce a declination. However, by mid-June Comey was already very far along in his plans to make a unilateral statement. Moreover, witnesses told us that the FBI had determined based on various factors that the allegations that Lynch interfered with the investigation were not credible, describing the information as "objectively false."
(redacted) Comey told the OIG that he never saw any actions by Lynch to interfere in the investigation. Rather, Comey was concerned that leaks of this non-credible information about Lynch would undermine her credibility. The FBI did not inform Lynch about the (redacted) reports until August 10, 2016, more than a month after Comey's public announcement. As we describe above, Lynch told the OIG that the information in the (redacted) reports was presented to her in a way that highlighted the FBI's assessment, that it lacked credibility. At no time did Comey alert Lynch or Yates that the information raised concerns about Lynch's ability to participate credibly in the Midyear investigation or in any declination announcement. At no time did Comey consult with Lynch or Yates about how to deal with the information in the (redacted) reports to protect the credibility of the declination decision.
(redacted) Finally, as described above, the (redacted) reports also included an allegation, equally lacking in credibility, that Comey was "leaning more to [R]epublicans, and most likely he will be dragging this investigation until the presidential elections; in order to effectively undermine the chances for the [Democratic Party] to win in the presidential elections." Comey did not inform Lynch or Yates of this information, let alone discuss with them whether it might be leaked or whether, if it was, it might undermine his credibility as a spokesman.
(redacted) As a result, we did not find Comey's concerns that information about Lynch in the (redacted) reports or any underlying communications would be released by DCLeaks or Wikileaks to be a persuasive justification for departing from well-established Department policies and acting unilaterally to announce the FBI's recommendation.
B. (redacted) Request to Review the (redacted) Data in the Midyear Investigation
(redacted) As described above, witnesses told us that State Department communications on the thumb drives (redacted). Although the thumb drives might contain relevant information, such as archived emails from the former Secretary's tenure, witnesses told us that they believed that any additional information obtained from them was unlikely to be material - i.e., would be unlikely to include communications from the beginning of former Secretary Clinton's tenure showing her intent in setting up and using a private email server, and thus would be unlikely to change the decision to decline prosecution with respect to former Secretary Clinton or her senior aides.
(redacted) Nonetheless, the May 2016 draft memorandum characterizes review of the first five thumb drives as necessary to conduct "a thorough and complete investigation and to assess the national security risks associated with former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's use of a private email server," and to determine "the full scope of unauthorized disclosure of classified emails found on the former Secretary's server and to identify any potential cyber intrusions of the server." The two FBI OGC witnesses who were involved in drafting this memorandum - Anderson and FBI Attorney 1 - described the memorandum as an advocacy piece that was intended to present the best case for using the Midyear investigation as a way to obtain access to the thumb drives. However, Strzok, the Lead Analyst, and the Midyear SSA told the OIG that they viewed review of the thumb drives as a logical investigative lead that might allow them to obtain access to additional State Department emails.
(redacted) In assessing the FBI's handling of this issue, we are mindful of the analytical framework we applied in our review. As we state in our unclassified report, we did not substitute the OIG's judgment for the judgments made by the FBI or the Department regarding the substantive merits of investigative or prosecutive decisions, but rather looked at whether the circumstances surrounding a decision indicated that it was based on considerations other than the merits of the investigation. However, no witness we interviewed recalled who made the decision not to submit the memorandum requesting permission to review the thumb drives to the Department, or even whether any decision was made. Anderson said that she recalled mentioning the thumb drives during a discussion with Comey around the same time the Midyear team was engaged in efforts to obtain the Mills and Samuelson laptops, and Strzok's notes indicate that the request for thumb drive access was discussed in.a May 10, 2016 meeting with Comey. In addition, FBI Attorney 1 told us that discussions about whether to request permission to review the thumb drives for purposes of the Midyear investigation "just dropped off," and that FBI management would have been aware that it was "an issue dangling out there." As a result, we cannot assess who made the decision not to request review of the thumb drives for purposes of the Midyear investigation or what the basis for that decision was.
(redacted) However, we understand from FBI officials that Midyear-related concerns are secondary to the potential relevance of the (redacted) data to other issues, including the need to review the thumb drives for general foreign intelligence purposes. We also acknowledge that there may be legitimate privilege concerns related to some of the intercepted U.S. victim communications. The FBI has now submitted a memorandum to the Department requesting permission to conduct a comprehensive review of the thumb drives for foreign intelligence purposes, and we encourage both the Department and the FBI to continue pursuing efforts to obtain access to this data to the extent consistent with law, including any applicable privileges.
The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG) is a statutorily created independent entity whose mission is to detect and deter waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct in the Department of Justice, and to promote economy and efficiency in the Department's operations.
To report allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, or misconduct regarding DOJ programs, employees, contractors, grants, or contracts please visit or call the DOJ OIG Hotline at oig.justice.gov/hotline or (800) 869-4499.
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