In July, ODNI declassified and released 2017 HPSCI(Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence) Majority staff report regarding "Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election". Below is the link to ODNI press release:
... President Obama directed the creation of this January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment after President Trump defeated Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election, and it served as the basis for what was essentially a years-long coup against the duly elected President of the United States, subverting the will of the American people and attempting to delegitimize Donald Trump’s presidency. ...
The declassified 46-page report in PDF format can be downloaded via the link below:
I'm archiving its text to make it searchable here. This is part 11.
Finding #6: The ICA Misrepresented Documents on Putin's Intentions
ICD 203 states that proper tradecraft "makes accurate judgments and assessments." Accurate judgments require that raw reports be correctly quoted, and significant "contrary information" that does not support the judgments be included and explained.
Significant reports cited in support of judgments of Putin's intentions were not quoted accurately, were not quoted in context, or were selectively quoted to omit evidence that undermined ICA major judgments. Moreover, critical information that undermined source credibility and veracity of key reporting was omitted from both the ICA text and the subsequent briefings of the document to the President-elect, the US Congress, and the White House staff.
A Key Russian Political Assessment Was Incorrectly Cited As Supporting the ICA Judgment That Putin Aspired to Help Trump Win. The ICA falsely cited an analysis of the US elections by Russian experts on American politics as evidence of Putin's intentions. On closer examination of the raw intelligence, however, the report was not only badly misquoted, it provided additional evidence that Putin didn't care if Trump won or not, the opposite of the ICA key judgment that it was alleged to support.(redacted)
(redacted) analysts following American politics (redacted) sent their assessment of the final two months of the US election (redacted). It examined the prospects for candidates Trump and Clinton, and various factors that could influence the outcome.
(redacted) This report revealed what Putin was being told by (redacted), which might have influenced his thinking. It was obtained from (redacted).(redacted)
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(redacted) The (redacted) analysts speculated that Republican Speaker Ryan wanted candidate Trump to lose, so Ryan could run against President Clinton in 2020, and that "traditional Republican supporters" were refusing to assist candidate Trump.(redacted)
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(redacted) The assessment predicted Trump would lose the election, based on a host of factors, and that the only way he might win was if he obtained "remarkable compromising material" on Secretary Clinton.(redacted)
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(redacted) assessed with a high degree of probability that, "regardless of who won" neither candidate would view Russia as an equal partner.(redacted)
The ICA cites this report using a misleading topic sentence, "We assess that Russian leaders never entirely abandoned hope for a defeat of Secretary Clinton" (see box "Misrepresenting a Key Russian Assessment").(redacted)
What the ICA Says: Misrepresenting a Key Russian Assessment
There were four bullets of evidence under the ICA judgment that the Russian influence campaign "aspired" to help candidate Trump win. The third bullet - citing the Russian analytic report - says:
(redacted) "We assess that Russian leaders never entirely abandoned hope for a defeat of Secretary Clinton. (redacted) assessed for Russian leadership in (redacted) the only way to improve [Trump's] chances was if his campaign had sufficiently derogatory information at its disposal about Secretary Clinton, (redacted)." (emphasis added) [ICA p.3]
The wording implies that reliable reporting supports the judgment. But the actual cited intelligence says something quite different. Specifically, the raw report:
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(redacted) Does not state - nor does it infer - that Russian leaders "never abandoned hope" for defeating Clinton, nor does it even use the word "hope" or similar phrasing.(redacted)
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(redacted) Does not in any way describe the aspirations, plans or intentions of Putin or other Russian leaders.(redacted)
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(redacted) Does not describe Putin's "aspiration to help Trump's chances of victory" nor does it propose contrasting Clinton unfavorably to Trump.(redacted)
(redacted) The cited analytic report is nothing more than a clinical analysis of factors affecting the election contest, written by (redacted) political analysts.(redacted)
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The assessment is intended to inform Putin of factors that might affect the election, not to tell him what his objectives ought to be.
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(redacted) The ICA points out that sensitive decisions on Russia's covert influence policy are made by Putin personally, and it would thus be inappropriate in the Russian system for (redacted) intelligence analysts to tell the President what his goals ought to be regarding candidate Clinton.(redacted)
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The ICA cites no other classified report to make the case that Putin "never entirely abandoned hope for a defeat of Secretary Clinton."
The Russian analytic report actually undermines the broader ICA judgment that Putin "aspired" to help Trump win, to include the secondary judgment that Putin "never abandoned hope" for defeating Clinton:
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(redacted) The (redacted) report demonstrated that Putin's intelligence analysts warned him that candidate Trump was likely to lose without "remarkable compromising material" on Secretary Clinton that would "discredit her completely."(redacted)
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(redacted) As described earlier in this investigation report, Putin did possess "remarkable" compromising material on candidate Clinton, and not only did he hold it back, he did so when it mattered most, in the closing weeks of the campaign as the polls narrowed.
The ICA thus not only misquotes the report, but fails to adhere to ICD 203 directive to address "contrary information" such as why Putin chose not to help Trump when intelligence indicated such help would be critical to Trump having any chance of winning the election.
(redacted) This Russian analytic report also provides evidence - supported by other classified reports from multiple sources - that some Russian officials and experts believed there was little difference between candidates Trump and Clinton in terms of helping Moscow's strategic interests.
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(redacted) The (redacted) report concludes by noting "with a high degree of confidence" that US-Russia relations are unlikely to improve "_regardless of which candidate" were to win.(redacted)
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(redacted) Such a pessimistic assessment that neither candidate would improve relations with Moscow would hardly be likely to cause Putin to take action favor one candidate over another, and thus does not bolster the ICA claim that Moscow had a "clear preference" for Trump.
(redacted) The conclusion that neither candidate would be good for Russia appears to be a consistent theme among Russian intelligence and diplomatic experts, according to other HUMINT, SIGINT and diplomatic reporting detailed in this assessment.(redacted)