In July, ODNI declassified and released 2017 HPSCI(Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence) Majority staff report regarding "Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election". Below is the link to ODNI press release:
... President Obama directed the creation of this January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment after President Trump defeated Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election, and it served as the basis for what was essentially a years-long coup against the duly elected President of the United States, subverting the will of the American people and attempting to delegitimize Donald Trump’s presidency. ...
The declassified 46-page report in PDF format can be downloaded via the link below:
I'm archiving its text to make it searchable here. This is part 17.
Finding #7: The iCA Failed to Consider Significant Alternative Hypotheses Suggested by Intelligence Reporting and Observed Russian Behavior
ICD 203 states that proper tradecraft "incorporates analysis of alternatives" to include "systematic evaluation of differing hypotheses to explain events or phenomena." It explains that plausible alternative hypotheses are "particularly important when major judgments must contend with significant uncertainties" and when alternative assessments might "produce high-impact results" (emphasis added).(redacted)
Discerning what was in the mind of President Putin that led him to order covert influence operations was fraught with significant uncertainties.
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Under these circumstances, it was important that the ICA address reasonable alternative hypotheses.
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By adopting a single-track explanation for Putin's actions - that he "preferred" candidate Trump and "aspired" to help him win - the ICA authors had little choice but to ignore contrary evidence and attempt to force-fit weak evidence to make their case.
The ICA Single-track Hypothesis Mislead US Policymakers on a Textbook "High-impact" Intelligence Judgment. This was a particularly serious tradecraft mistake, because Putin's objectives had to be accurately understood by US policymakers in order to appreciate the actual effects of the Russian operations on the election or to take actions to mitigate threats to future US elections.
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With three versions of the ICA being published - Top Secret/limited dissemination, Top Secret, and Unclassified - the ICA general conclusions were available to everyone, and the publicity these generated ensured the document was widely read.(redacted)
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The DNI reported that highest classified compartmented version was shared with some 250 US officials, an extraordinarily high number for such a sensitive document.(redacted)
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The ICA judgments affected all manner of decisions by Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of government, as well as the perceptions of American democracy by US allies, foreign opponents, the US and world media, and American citizens.
Collectively, these factors made the ICA a "high impact" assessment that demanded the highest standards of tradecraft, to include the consideration of plausible alternative hypotheses.(redacted)
The ICA ignored Strong Indicators Supporting the Alternative Hypothesis That, at a Minimum, Putin Didn't Care Who Won, and Even Had Reasons to Prefer a Clinton Victory. By keeping the most damaging material on Clinton in reserve, Putin was not only demonstrating a clear lack of concern for Trump's election fate, but conversely, his actions could also indicate that he preferred to see Secretary Clinton elected, knowing she would be a more vulnerable President than candidate Trump. Moscow's reserve of compromising materials would have given Putin leverage over a Clinton Administration, but not a Trump one.(redacted)
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(redacted) The ICA glossed over the significance that "Moscow held back some pre-election influence efforts for potential later use" without explaining how much more damaging these were than the relatively benign materials leaked during the election, and the implications that Putin preferred Clinton to win or at least didn't care.(redacted)
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(redacted) The ICA also did not address the possibility that, even setting aside the compromising materials Moscow had on Secretary Clinton, Putin might have considered her the weaker prospect for President, given the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) reporting on her psychological health.(redacted)
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(redacted) The FBI had information from (redacted) that pointed to the possibility that President Putin had reasons to prefer Secretary Clinton win, because Russia "knew where Clinton stood and despite media stories, could work with her" according to (redacted).(redacted)
(redacted) Russian Strategic Plans Appeared to Prioritize Post-election Influence Operations, Rather Than "Aspiring" to Help Trump Win the Election. (redacted) omitted from the ICA - provides more evidence that President Putin's priorities were not focused on election operations designed to help candidate Trump to win. Rather, his priorities appeared focused on post-election operations to undermine the credibility of the expected, and possibly preferred, Clinton Administration, and on calling into question the fairness and effectiveness of the American democratic process.
ICD 203 directs the analysis of alternatives, and this intelligence further reinforces the alternative hypothesis that, from Putin's perspective, candidate Clinton was uniquely more vulnerable to Russian influence operations.
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(redacted) In early August 2016, (redacted) reviewed the ongoing leaks of anti-Clinton materials and pressure (redacted) to collect more, (redacted).(redacted)
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(redacted) (redacted) (The ICA timeline of Russian operations shows the last dump of emails began on 7 October, when WikiLeaks started leaking the Clinton Campaign Manager emails.) (redacted) (redacted)(redacted)
(redacted) The timing and context of these (redacted) discussions - addressing possession and leaking of emails damaging to candidate Clinton - suggests (redacted) was deliberately "laying low" with unspecified material and planning "to shoot" after the election when the new Administration was setting up.
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(redacted) (redacted) does not specify which candidate they expected to attack or the details of what (redacted) means, but the context suggest it was leaking the particularly damaging emails on Secretary Clinton, that were held back prior to the election.
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(redacted) It is clear, however, that the goals discussed did not involve helping one candidate or the other to win the election, but rather, "getting ready" for the big attack after the election when the new Administration was setting-up.
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(redacted) The strategic plan would only work if Secretary Clinton won the election, and the reserve materials Moscow held on her would be leaked - a plausible explanation for "to shoot" in this context - in conjunction with the media campaign Russian intelligence was preparing.(redacted)
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(redacted) made no mention - directly or indirectly - of operations to help candidate Trump win or to denigrate him after the election.
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(redacted) The ICA indicated no evidence of similar damaging material being held by Moscow on candidate Trump, making him less vulnerable to such post-election influence operations than Secretary Clinton.