In July, ODNI declassified and released 2017 HPSCI(Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence) Majority staff report regarding "Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election". Below is the link to ODNI press release:
... President Obama directed the creation of this January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment after President Trump defeated Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election, and it served as the basis for what was essentially a years-long coup against the duly elected President of the United States, subverting the will of the American people and attempting to delegitimize Donald Trump’s presidency. ...
The declassified 46-page report in PDF format can be downloaded via the link below:
I'm archiving its text to make it searchable here. This is part 1.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE BY THE DNI ON 22 JULY 2025
(redacted)
Oversight Investigation & Referral
18 September 2020
The Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA)
"Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election"
(redacted)
Why This Study?
The conclusions of the Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA), "Russian influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election," raised concerns about Russian attempts to undermine confidence in the US election system, prompting a comprehensive examination of the ICA’s analysis.
Investigators compared the ICA analytic tradecraft against the standards prescribed in Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203, "Analytic Standards," the primary guiding document for evaluation of analytic products for the Intelligence Community (IC).(redacted) Investigators spent over 2,300 hours reviewing the ICA and its source reports, mostly at CIA Headquarters in the compartmented reports vault, and on outside related research. In addition, 20 interviews were conducted of intelligence officers or FBI agents who were associated with managing or drafting the ICA or the production of raw reporting cited as ICA sources.
Recommendations
1. Improve peer review of controversial assessments involving limited-access intelligence.
2. Require political appointees to recuse themselves from managing such assessments during a presidential transition.
3. Mandate that finished analysis citing substandard raw intelligence reports include a context footnote explaining all factors that reduce confidence in the information.
What the Majority Found
Most ICA judgments on Russia's activities in the US election employed proper analytic tradecraft and were consistent with observed Russian behavior. The key judgments found to be credible include: 1) President Putin ordered conventional and cyber influence operations, notably by leaking politically sensitive emails obtained from computer intrusions; 2) Putin's principal motivations in these operations were to undermine faith in the US democratic process and to weaken what the Russians considered to be an inevitable Clinton presidency; and 3) Putin held back leaking some compromising material for post-election use against the expected Clinton administration.
In contrast to the rest of the ICA, the judgment that Putin developed "a clear preference" for candidate Trump and "aspired to help his chances of victory" did not adhere to the tenets of the ICD, Analytic Standards:
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The Director of CIA (DCIA) ordered the post-election publication of 15 reports containing previously collected but unpublished intelligence, three of which were substandard - containing information that was unclear, of uncertain origin, potentially biased, or implausible - and those became foundational sources for the ICA judgments that Putin preferred Trump over Clinton. The ICA misrepresented these reports as reliable, without mentioning their significant underlying flaws.
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One scant, unclear, and unverifiable fragment of a sentence from one of the substandard reports constitutes the only classified information cited to suggest Putin "aspired" to help Trump win.(redacted)
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The ICA ignored or selectively quoted reliable intelligence reports that challenged - and in some cases undermined - judgments that Putin sought to elect Trump.(redacted)
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The ICA failed to consider plausible alternative explanations of Putin's intentions indicated by reliable intelligence and observed Russian actions.
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DCIA picked five CIA analysts to write the ICA, and rushed its production in order to publish two weeks before President-elect Trump was sworn-in. Hurried coordination and limited access to the draft reduced opportunities for the IC to discover misquoting of sources and other tradecraft errors.
DETAILED FINDINGS
This is the unredacted, fully-sourced, limited-access investigation report that was drafted and stored in a limited-access vault at CIA Headquarters.
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Although the principal findings of this report are identical to the Top Secret downgraded version prepared for members of Congress, this version contains significantly more detailed quotations from sensitive reports - to include source descriptions from raw intelligence - and extensive footnotes citing raw intelligence reports and interviews of IC officers.
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The names of IC officers quoted in the main text were omitted by prior agreement with the agencies, but are available in the footnotes of the original sourced copy.
Finding #1: The Bulk of ICA Judgments on Russia's Election Operations Were Sound and Employed Proper Analytic Tradecraft
The majority found most ICA judgments on Russia's election activities to be well reasoned, consistent with observed Russian actions, properly documented, and - particularly on the cyber intrusion sections - employed appropriate caveats on sources and identified assumptions. The key ICA judgments that the Majority found credible are summarized below:
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Russian efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election represent the most recent expression of Moscow's longstanding desire to undermine the US liberal democratic order.(redacted)
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Russian intelligence services, acting on the orders of Russian President Vladimir Putin, launched conventional and cyber influence operations - notably by leaking politically sensitive emails obtained from computer intrusions - during the 2016 election.(redacted)
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Putin's principal motivations in these influence operations were to advance Moscow's longstanding desire to undermine faith in US democracy, and to weaken from the start what the Russians considered to be an inevitable Clinton presidency.(redacted)
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Putin held back leaking some compromising material to use against the expected Clinton Administration after they took office.(redacted)
The operations officers at CIA and NSA who produced the raw intelligence cited in the ICA showed great professionalism.
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CIA Collection Management Officers (CMOs) in particular, did an excellent job of employing detailed context statements that spelled-out evidentiary problems affecting the reliability of raw intelligence.
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The drafters of ICA did not accurately cite the most critical context statements (addressed in detail later in this study) but the original raw reports were nonetheless professionally prepared.(redacted)
Finding #2: Significant Tradecraft Failings Cast Doubt on ICA Judgments of Putin's Intentions
In contrast to the ICA's other judgments, the sections addressing Putin's intentions for influencing the US election did not observe professional criteria set forth in ICD 203, Analytic Standards.(redacted)
- These failures were serious enough to call into question judgments that allege Putin "developed a clear preference for candidate Trump" and "aspired to help his chances of victory" and that "Russian leaders never entirely abandoned hope for a defeat of Secretary Clinton."(redacted)
(redacted) The DNI describes Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 Analytic Standards as the document that "establishes the Intelligence Community (IC) analytic standards that govern the production and evaluation of analytic products; articulates the responsibility of intelligence analyst to strive for excellence, integrity, and rigor in their analytic thinking and work practices."